Junk's Tats

My friend Junk has a problem. At the end of every season, he tattoos the names of 3-4 players from the two teams he follows onto his abdomen. Below each name, he has the year, the team's record in games that he played, and the team's record in games that he did not play. Junk goes through the whole roster, of course, and finds the players for whom the disparity is greatest, and unless it's close and there's a more notable player to go with, he chooses the player whose presence ostensibly was of the greatest benefit or detriment.

Anyway, Junk got me trashed last night and I blacked out early. I awoke this morning to a pounding headache. When I got up to use the restroom, I saw my reflection in the mirror and screeched in terror at what I had done. There it was, in blue block letters encircling my belly button:

MARK SWEENEY
DODGERS, 8/10/07 to 6/29/07
WHEN HE PLAYED: 35-51
WHEN HE SAT: 25-17

Joe Torre: Proctology

New feature at Fangraphs yields this list of most relief innings pitched, 6/24/05 to 6/23/08:

Heilman: 261.2 IP, 3.34 ERA, 3.34 FIP, 0.96 WPA
Proctor: 257.2 IP, 4.37 ERA, 4.74 FIP, -0.35 WPA
Qualls: 254 IP, 3.19 ERA, 3.90 FIP, 2.61 WPA
Torres: 251.1 IP, 3.37 ERA, 3.70 FIP, 4.41 WPA
Shields: 243.2 IP, 3.10 ERA, 3.32 FIP, 6.23 WPA
Guerrier: 240.1 IP, 2.92 ERA, 4.14 FIP, 2.27 WPA
Howry: 238 IP, 3.21 ERA, 3.45 FIP, 4.00 WPA
Rivera: 232.1 IP, 2.01 ERA, 2.31 FIP, 11.69 WPA
Rauch: 225.1 IP, 3.32 ERA, 3.66 FIP, 3.53 WPA
Gregg: 224.2 IP, 3.36 ERA, 3.69 FIP, 2.28 WPA

Proctor is the only reliever with an ERA over 4 or a negative WPA in the top ten. Among the top thirty, only two pitchers have ERA's that are not at least a half run better than Proctor's, and there are only three pitchers with FIP's that are not at least a half run better than Proctor's. Of the pitchers in the top 30 in innings in relief since 6/24/2008, ONE has an ERA worse than Proctor (Joel Peralta, 4.44) and NONE have a worse FIP or a worse WPA total. Despite this, Proctor is second in relief innings pitched.

Now, fortunately Proctor has pitched in average leverage contexts, with an LI of 0.99. Here are the relievers with an LI between 0.85 and 1.05, a FIP of 4.40 or greater and at least 120 IP over the past three years, in order of innings pitched:

Proctor, 257.2
Grabow, 189.2
Romero, 161.2
Jamie Walker, 154.1
Kline, 132.1
Pinto, 131
Tavarez, 130
Dohmann, 120

Only Proctor and Grabow (4.8) have FIPs over 4.63, and only Proctor and Tavarez (-2.58) have negative WPA totals. It is just baffling that Proctor has been used so much. Maybe Torre was trying to get back at Cashman for dealing Ventura? In fairness, Proctor's LI in 2008 is 0.60. But in fairness, Hong-Chih Kuo's is 0.57.

I didn't go further than the above because Sharpfang for some reason does not include BFP (or TBF or PA, whatever you call it) for pitchers! David should add that; exporting to Excel is exciting, but doing so and then finding it doesn't have the key unit for analysis is rather disappointing.

Checking in

I had a completely neglected (since I basically make no attempt to generate visitors ... whatever) contest challenge last year at the end of this post:

Contest time: Guess the 2008 Salaries
I'll buy a 2008 THT Annual for anyone who is within $903,074 for all five.

Randy Wolf
Brett Tomko
Odalis Perez
Mark Hendrickson (arb eligible)
Aaron Sele

I think one of those is pretty easy. Guess which one, if you so please. Entries must be in the comments section by 10:38 a.m. PST on December 30th, 2006.

Wolf: $4.75 mm, up to $9m with incentives (a full $9mm would entail 30 GS and 200 IP, and he's on his way)
Tomko: $3mm, up to $4.5mm with incentives (or more if he wins awards, but that's not going to happen)
Perez: $850,000, plus more with 20+ GS
Hendrickson: (arb declined) $1.5mm, up to $2.5mm with incentives ($2.5mm at 30 GS)
Sele: $0, so far as I can tell (he was the one that I deemed "pretty easy" to guess)

Penny f/x (originally posted in comments at Dodger Thoughts)

I remember there was a discussion on Penny's pitches in a recent DT thread, and Josh Kalk has just released the 2008 version of his pitch f/x tool (http://tinyurl.com/4ul6sr). So I checked Penny's numbers. The average NL pitcher this season has 3.79 pitches per batter faced, with 18.7% of pitches batted, 43.4% of pitches strikes (non-batted), and 37.9% of pitches balls. Penny overall has had 1453 pitches, 1293 of which were tracked. Penny's pitches have been 19.1% batted, 43.3% strikes, and 37.6% balls.

On batted balls, the league has a .347 wOBA against with .207 singles per batted ball and a .187 ISO; Penny's batted balls have had a .351 wOBA, .255 singles/batted ball, and a .137 ISO.

Of the charted pitches, Penny has 67% fastballs, 17% curves, and 16% change-ups.
FB: 37.6% balls, 19.1% batted, .376 battedballwOBA, .259 1b/batted, .162 ISO
CV: 40.6% balls, 16.6% batted, .344 battedballwOBA, .306 1b/batted, .056 ISO
CH: 37.5% balls, 22.6% batted, .267 battedballwOBA, .191 1b/batted, .106 ISO

So the fastball has been hit hard when put into play and the changeup has been pretty effective in generating outs. The [Eric] Enders hypothesis [from a previous DT thread] seems to hold - hitters are either sitting on the fastball or getting very lucky on it (actually, some combination thereof).

Here are the uncharted pitches (11% of his total):
33.8% balls, 18.1% batted, .358 battedballwOBA, .276 1b/batted, .138 ISO

While the fastball has been hit hard, Penny has still been only one run below average on batted balls. What is really concerning is that he's thrown basically a league average split of balls/strikes/batted balls, but has a szERA (strike zone ERA, an ERA estimator using only K, BB, and BFP, although Tango seems to have renamed it kwERA (for K and Walks)) of 4.97 against the league's 4.39. Maybe he just hasn't had the right sequencing, or maybe he just doesn't have the right stuff to put hitters away.

* * *

2007 data is available at the same link. Penny's fastball worked WAY better last season. I had actually already run the 2007 numbers for Penny a few months back.

Total: 35.4% balls, 20.2% batted, .315 battedballwOBA, .218 1b/batted, .117 ISO

Charted pitches: 71.9% fastball, 12.0% curve, 16.1% changeup. 36.9% of pitches were uncharted.

FB: 34.3%, 19.4%, .273, .207, .085
CV: 35.5%, 18.4%, .385, .267, .133
CH: 39.3%, 23.5%, .425, .273, .182
Charted (tot): 35.3%, 19.9%, .314, .227, .108
Uncharted: 35.8%, 20.7%, .315, .203, .130

That's a .102 difference in wOBA on batted fastballs (that were charted)! And the (charted) curves and changes that were put into play were hit harder than his (charted) fastballs have been this season. The difference in the results of his batted pitches has been pretty night and day.

His szERA was 4.54, and part of the dropoff in that can (in addition to variance etc.) be explained by the 2% increase in balls per pitch. And in case anyone was wondering whether his lack of K this season stems from an inordinate number of foul balls, he's actually had a smaller percentage of foul balls in 2008 overall, including a smaller percentage of fastballs.

* * *

A split finger FB should be included among the fastballs. I could be wrong, though. Josh's tool lets you break them down by velocity, and I see that Penny has 69 pitches listed as fastballs that are under 90 mph, so I'm assuming that that includes the splitters. The "uncharted" pitches are ones that weren't captured by the f/x, not ones that don't fit into the classification system. If you're really interested in the splitter and its classification, I think Mike Fast is the guy to talk to since he works with the spin data (and I bet if you asked he'd probably do the research). As I understand it, unless you are looking at spin (the Kalk tool does not) you can't differentiate different types of FB.

* * *

I broke Penny's fastballs in 2008 down by velocity:

<88 6
88 27
89 36
90 45
91 68
92 108
93 128
94 160
95 151
96 91
97 42
98 6

I then broke them down into four groups: a) less than 92 (182 pitches), b) 92+ and less than 94 (236), c) 94+ and less than 96 (311), and 96+ (139).

The six numbers below are average velocity, %balls, %batted, wOBA on batted balls, singles per batted ball, and isolated power.
a) 90.33, 38.5%, 17.0%, .225, .161, .065
b) 93.09, 39.4%, 15.7%, .414, .243, .216
c) 94.99, 34.4%, 21.9%, .343, .309, .074
d) 96.81, 40.3%, 21.6%, .559, .267, .400

Sample size caveats should be peppered throughout any analysis like this, obviously. It would seem that his slowest fastballs (presumably these are mostly split finger) have been very effective. This feeds the "hitters are sitting on (non-splitter) fastballs" hypothesis. The fastballs that have been have been slower have been hammered and also have missed the zone more. The fastballs in his typical range (94-95) appear to have the best command (by ball%) and have not been hit hard power-wise (.074 ISO) but have been slapped for a ton of singles. The fastest fastballs have been hammered when hit (both in terms of power and singles) and have missed the zone quite a bit. If you check out the plot (http://tinyurl.com/3tefym), he just does not seem to have good command on the fastest fastballs (though a) sample size and b) I don't know the general spread): the hits have all been out over the middle of the plate and, except for two that were kept down, have been in the upper half of the zone without being in the upper sixth or so of the strike zone.

Taking a look at the strikes that weren't put into play, here are the percentages of called strikes, swinging strikes, and fouls in that order:
a) 51.9, 9.9, 38.3
b) 45.3, 9.4, 45.3
c) 25.7, 15.4, 58.8
d) 30.2, 13.2, 56.6

Including ALL pitches (not just strikes), the swings per pitch are a) .385, b) .403, c) .543, d) .482. So it seems that hitters have laid off of or have been deceived by the slower fastballs (again, hitters that can differentiate them seem to be laying off the splitter, bolstering its success) and batters are not having too much difficulty getting the bat on the higher velocity FB's. Balls in play per strike shows a) .306, b) .279, c) .362, and d) .311, so it really does seem that hitters are waiting for a typical Penny fastball and slapping them for singles.

So the data seems to back up Eric's hypothesis very well - well done!

UPDATE: I've been trying to learn more about Penny's repertoire and whether it's as simple as FB/CU/CH or if there are (as I have seen suggested from various sources in this search) splitters, sinkers, sliders, or 2-seamers (or, as some state, no true change-ups). I really don't think I'm any closer. I've looked at a lot of this. And this and this. I wonder if we could get Aaron Hintz and Harry Pavlidis to come to a consensus.

Billy Ashley was not a bad major league hitter

Andrew Grant, you have been warned.

I'm really tired of people repeating that conventional wisdom as if it were truth. Ashley hit .233/.307/.409 in 683 PA, implying that he was -5 runs per full season's playing time. Ashley didn't see regular playing time, faced a lot of relievers, and managed to hit .275/.333/.520 in his 331 PA against lefties. So we have a hitter who was only slightly below average with just one season's worth of PA.

BUT THERE'S MORE!

Ashley's career numbers include some pretty awful hitting in 1992 and 1993, Ashley's age 21 and 22 season. Ashley didn't have a monster year in the minors until 1994, when he turned 24 a month before the strike. (In fact, while Ashley may have been very hyped at some point, Ashley really did not show much power in the minors until he hit AA at age 21. He was again fairly impressive the next season in Albuquerque, but he didn't really learn how to take a walk until his 1994 season at Albuquerque).

His numbers with the Dodgers from 1994 on are .227/.312/.411 (-1 run) in 518 PA. Throw in his scorching call-up for Boston (24 AB, 3 HR, 3 2B) and you get a post-93 total of .230/.313/.430 in 544 PA, which league/park adjusted is +2 runs. Perhaps he should be debited for poor situational hitting or something? Well, Fangraphs has him at -1.09 WPA, -.52 REW, and +.45 WPA/LI. That's obviously not a compelling case given the size of the sample and his usage. Further, beyond the sample being small, we *KNOW* that it was a qualitatively poor sample - lots of pinch hitting, irregular playing time, etc., and each of these carries a pretty considerable penalty. His breakdown of PA was 27.2% 1st time against SP, 23.9% 2nd time, 15.8% 3rd plus time, and 34.0% against relievers. What if he had been given Eric Karros' playing time? As the cleanup hitter from 1995-1997, Karros faced 23.0%, 22.5%, 22.7%, and 31.8%, respectively. If Ashley had been given Karros' PA, he would have put up much better numbers. Karros faced a pitcher for the first time in a game less than 54% of the time, but Ashley did it over 61% - what if that extra 7% had been PA against pitchers for the third plus time, when he hit .299/.372/.545 from 1994-8?

Why in the world would you give up on someone who was a strong minor league hitter because of this major league performance? He did not establish himself as a *good* major league hitter, but he clearly was not horribly overmatched or "eaten alive." Simply put, his hitting skills were not appreciated because of the way he made his outs and his ratio of hits to at bats, and that forced him out of the major leagues before he could prove that he was a qualified major league hitter. In terms of his actual results, they are disappointing but the sample has severe problems both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Billy Ashley may have been overhyped, but that is of significance only to those with an interest in hype. Maybe he was not truly good enough to be an average every day player, but that all depends on his defense. As a hitter, I think he was clearly good enough to be at least a fringe regular, and he was DEFINITELY good enough that he should have been a platoon partner ("lefty-masher") in the big leagues for a pretty long time. Teams were foolish on Ashley, and I'm gonna stick to my Roger Daltrey not-getting-fooled-again guns on any player who gets compared to Ashley.

I don't have the research on college players who strike out a lot, so I'm not really going to weigh in on Russell. I don't know much about him, so anything here is speculation based off the 4 videos I've seen and his college stats. It is really annoying to me that a) he is being compared to a lot of players who are just cherry-picked as high HR, high K failures instead of being compared to players without a selection bias and b) he is being compared to players whose value was diminished by poor defense as if it is a given that his defensive skills are on the same level. He gets a lot of comparisons to Branyan and (from Dodgers fans exclusively, as far as I can tell) Billy Ashley. Sure, as a hitter, he has a similar approach based on the results. But those hitters both were drafted out of high school (Ashley a 3rd round pick, Branyan in the 7th). Is this really a reasonable comparison? No, it's people drawing up the scenario of what it will look like when Russell fails. And the reason why players like Branyan and Ashley had a hard time getting past the K-stigma (and the BA-stigma variant) and SSS-stigma (small sample size) was because they had little defensive value. Well, Andrew compares him to Ashley even as he had just linked to a scouting report that implies Russell will be about an average defender in right field. Plus, Andrew derisively suggests that his ceiling is Jack Cust - WTF? A player's ceiling is hitting like Cust and being an average RF defender, and you're not excited about that? I simply do not get it. That is a high ceiling for anybody, and you have to get lucky to get that kind of play out of the average tenth pick in the draft, much less a third rounder. That's not to say that Russell will reach that ceiling, but how can anybody consider it less than a really high and exciting ceiling? Was there any corner outfielder in the draft with a higher ceiling than Russell if his ceiling is indeed Cust + average defense?

Kyle Russell obviously hasn't shown that he can make the transition to professional baseball, let alone the major leagues. His approach is based on waiting for the ball to get pretty deep in the zone, so obviously if he does not improve he won't cut it against major league players. Well, that is the point of player development - to develop a player with talent into a major leaguer. I don't know if Russell has what it takes or not, but his performance record at college simply does not lend itself to disparaging his abilities. Russell has been a dominant hitter at the college level. That dominance is being disparaged because it was a certain kind of dominance, a high-K kind of dominance. It is ridiculous to mix arguments about how projectable his particular skills are to the major league with an assessment that TTO college hitters cannot progress upwardly. Some can and some can't. A strikeout is not a scathing indictment that proves hitter failure. To be a good power hitter, you must strike out more often because a) you should generally be more selective and b) it is harder to make contact as you are swinging hard. Someone who is struck out by a lot of college pitchers is, with no other info available, not impressive. But someone who is willing to get some strike outs here and there in order to be able to draw a lot of walks and hit a lot of home runs? That is a different story, and we should read the whole book before we put a picture of Billy Ashley on its cover. And even if Billy Ashley is on the cover, it's still a book that demands rapt attention, because Ashley was not who Dodger fans decided he was.

If you tell me a player's hitting will be 70% Ashley and 30% Cust, then I'm salivating at the mouth. If he can play a solid RF, then I'm sold.

Heck, Russell himself seems to know a lot more about the value of these sorts of comparisons:

PING!: As a tall, thin and strong left-handed outfielder, you’ve grown comparisons to Shawn Green. Additionally your game has been compared to Adam Dunn with better defense. Do you feel those comparisons are accurate or would you say a different resemblance is more fitting?

RUSSELL: Those comparisons are flattering to hear considering both those players have been very successful at the major league level. I feel though that I am just trying to be like Kyle Russell. I have had many players that I have looked up to my whole life, but I can’t say I am totally identical like Shawn Green or Adam Dun. Every individual has their own ‘style’.

Now, I'm going to go ahead and say I'd be pretty excited about getting Russell regardless of who drafted him. But if you tell me he was drafted in the 3rd round by Logan White? I mean, if Logan White signs off on giving him a 3rd round pick... that is not merely pretty exciting. I am stunned that Dodgers fans who worship at White's altar are acting as if this was a disappointing pick.

The Base Run Angels of Runs

Via a Rob McMillin link to his own archives I came across an old post by Jeff Angus at his Management by Baseball website about the Angels' emphasis on doing well in RISP and RISP/2out situations. Angus used a pretty small sample to make his point, so it got me wondering about how much the Angels' organization strategy has helped them.

So, I compared the Angels' offense from 2002 up through June 7, 2008 to the rest of the AL over the same span. The Angels compiled a .326 wOBA against the league's .330, which suggests a -141 run differential. By linear weights (including stolen bases and CS), I have them at -105. By Base Runs (using the most detailed formula), I have them as -77. In actual runs scored, however, they are +26 runs. So between baserunning and timeliness, they've managed an extra 103 runs over the 6.389 seasons in the sample. In other words, Base Runs tells us that their Pythagorean record should be .544 instead of the .553 it has been (their actual winning percentage has also been .553). So the Angels have won an extra ten games because of their baserunning (excluding SB and CS) and the timeliness of their hitting, or 1.5 wins per season.

So, that is the equivalent of each hitter being about +1.6 in baserunning+timeliness. So, if you want to give the franchise credit for its strategy, then give them 1.5 wins a year. However, there are two obvious reasons to discount that figure:

1. It could just be luck, or rather, we don't know how much to attribute to luck and how much to skill.
2. It doesn't account for the trade-offs of the strategy. If the Angels have picked players who are otherwise less valuable overall, then all else being equal that value needs to be subtracted from the 1.5 wins. Further, if the Angels are developing their hitters to be good in these areas (timeliness and baserunning), then the credit for the success of that strategy needs to be offset by whatever developmental losses it has incurred. If they make a player +1.6 runs in these areas, then the benefit would be swamped if that teaching results in the player getting three fewer walks and three more outs.

Three True Outcomes

My three favorite baseball players are Milton Bradley, Jayson Werth, and Russell Branyan. They're favorites of mine for roughly the same reasons - they have under-appreciated ups and over-frustrating downs, but I learned to love their approaches enough not to be frustrated by the downs even as they continue to keep them down. And this year, they are all having amazing years with the same caveats as always.

Both Bradley and Werth are good fielders with good power and good plate discipline who have been valuable when on the field. Bradley is the better player, but Werth isn't a slouch. Both were acquired by newly-hired Dodgers' GM Paul DePodesta in the week before the 2004 season began, and they were both key contributors in getting that team to the playoffs.* In 2005, they were slotted to be the starters alongside JD Drew with the Shawn Green trade. Werth was hit in the wrist by a pitch and missed the first two months and didn't hit very well in 395 PA after his return (.234/.338/.374, although he faced southpaws in only 20% of his PA's as opposed to 35% over the rest of his major league career.) Bradley missed two months with a finger injury as soon as Werth had returned, came back for one month, and then missed the final 38 games with a torn Patella tendon. After these setbacks and DePodesta's ousting, neither would play a regular season game as a Dodger again. Werth was out for all of 2006 and Bradley was shipped away, along with Antonio Perez, for Andre Ethier. Werth was non-tendered prior to the 2007 season and signed with the Phillies.

*It is often said that DePodesta inherited Dan Evans' team, but of the position players Dan Evans had only acquired Izturis, Encarnacion, Roberts, and Ventura, as well as giving NRI's to Hernandez and Saenz. Izturis, Encarnacion and Roberts were decent players with defense factored in, but they didn't do much offensively in 2004 (although it was Izturis' best year) and the latter two were traded at the deadline. Ventura was passable as a role player. The major contributions of Saenz and Hernandez, I am guessing, would not have come about without DePodesta purchasing their contracts. Maybe Evans really had them in his plans, but I doubt it. On the pitching side, Evans acquired the starting rotation of Weaver, Perez, Ishii, Nomo, and Lima, which combined for 842.2 IP and a 4.41ERA - and it would have been a lot worse if they didn't have an amazing defense behind them. To Evans' credit, he picked up valuable swing-man Wilson Alvarez and some decent relievers in Sanchez and Mota (he also acquired LOOGY Tom Martin who was traded at the deadline and Yhency Brazoban who was promoted at the deadline). DePodesta may have inherited Evans' team, but he pretty obviously improved it, and while DePo shouldn't get credit for Beltre's break out, Evans had nothing to do with it either. (Wanted to try out the Pozterisk.)

2006 and 2007 were more of the same for Bradley - outstanding play but only 50% playing time. San Diego, worried about his season-ending injury, chose not to offer him arbitration, and he signed with Texas for only $5.25 million. To reduce his injury risk, Texas said it would put him at DH to start the season. Werth had a great season in Philadelphia, avoiding injury for the most part (he had one month-long DL stint in July) and hitting .298/.404/.459 in 304 PA.

I didn't know much about Branyan until he was acquired by the Brewers in 2004. His back story is worth looking into if you're unfamiliar. While Branyan has never been good enough to be a star, teams have continued to be too wary of how he makes his outs (strikeouts) and his ratio of hits to at bats, and the Brewers were getting him after Cleveland gave up a second time (the first time, they at least got Ben Broussard; the second time, he was basically gratis). His glove isn't good enough to let him be a true underlooked gem, but he's been about an average major leaguer the whole decade and has been freely available time and time again. He hit .225/.307/.467 (.330 wOBA) in 805 PA for Cleveland before they dealt him at age 26, .232/.337/.481 (.350 wOBA) in 457 PA for Cincinnati before they non-tendered him, .247/.355/.506 (.360 wOBA) n 414 PA for Milwaukee before they DFA'd and released him after Toronto sent Corey Koskie packing in the wake of the Troy Glaus trade, .201/.283/.473 (.320 wOBA) in 193 PA for Tampa Bay (which was sort of overstocked on poor-fielding corner bats) before they swapped him for some half prospects from San Diego, where he hit .232/.357/.474 (.358 wOBA) in 233 PA before being released. (He had another 48 PA between St. Louis and Philly late in 2007, hitting .195/.313/.415 (.321 wOBA)). Thinking about the junk that teams like the Phillies and Twins have started at third in recent years, it legitimately angers me that Branyan never got a real shot and never had a salary over $1.25 million.

This season, each one has had great success tempered by the same old problems. Bradley leads the AL in OBP and SLG and hasn't missed more than the occasional game to injury. Werth has gotten decent playing time because of an injury to Shane Victorino and had a memorable 3 HR game to increase his national profile; in 148 PA, he's hit .260/.338/.519, putting his line since cast off by Colletti's Dodgers at .285/.382/.479 (.374 wOBA) in 451 PA. Branyan got his first extended taste of the Pacific Coast League, which is obviously a pretty good environment for him, and put up a .359/.453/.693 line in 176 PA. Milwaukee finally decided to bring him up and take RHP PA from Bill Hall, and he's hit .321/.441/.821 in 33 PA since being called up, bringing his major league line up to .230/.328/.483 (.344 wOBA) over 2183 PA.

I'm really happy for their successes, but each still must face the same issues they've dealt with all along. Bradley is killing the ball, but it could be that he'll only be able to keep doing so by staying at DH and staying away from the injury risks of playing the outfield. Werth is on the DL, and though he's begun his rehab assignment his ability to stay healthy for an extended period of time is in doubt. Branyan may finally stick with an organization that seems like it should like him, but his issue has always been when these organizations get capricious and managers see his trees and not his forest; with a dissatisfied sometime-hometown-favorite semi-star as his displaced platoon partner, he just doesn't have any job security.

Each of the three became familiar to me with their 2004 acquisition, played well with that franchise for two years, was discarded, and has played well since:

Milton Bradley:
2004-5: 908 PA, .275/.358/.446, .349 wOBA, 2.85 WPA, 1.98 WPA/LI
2006-8: 874 PA, .300/.400/.521, .395 wOBA, 5.50 WPA, 5.13 WPA/LI

Russell Branyan:
2004-5: 414 PA, .247/.355/.506, .360 wOBA, 0.51 WPA, 1.41 WPA/LI
2006-8: 507 PA, .222/.332/.491, .349 wOBA, -.16 WPA, 1.48 WPA/LI

Jayson Werth:
2004-5: 719 PA, .247/.338/.426, .334 wOBA, 0.92 WPA, 1.06 WPA/LI
2006-8: 451 PA, .285/.382/.479, .374 wOBA, 0.93 WPA, 2.14 WPA/LI

So here's to three great players whose great 2008's might finally get them the recognition and pay they've earned over the years. And here's to Kyle Russell, who, if he ends up as good as any of these three, will have been a steal.

Update: Werth was activated for today's game. - June 8